Overfishing: a threat to marine biodiversity
Fishing is central to the livelihood and food security of 200 million people, especially in the developing world, while one in five people worldwide depends on fish as their primary source of protein.
However, global fish stocks are in jeopardy, increasingly pressured by overfishing and environmental degradation. According to a UN Food and Agriculture Organization estimate, over 70 per cent of the world's fish species are either fully exploited or depleted. The 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, in Johannesburg, South Africa, called for the establishment of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), which many experts believe may hold the key to conserving and boosting fish stocks. Yet, according to the UN Environment Programme, less than 1 per cent of the world's oceans and seas are currently in MPAs.
The Johannesburg forum stressed the importance of restoring depleted fisheries and acknowledged that sustainable fishing requires partnerships by and between governments, fishermen, communities and industry. The summit urged countries to ratify the Convention on the Law of the Sea and other instruments that promote maritime safety and protect the environment from marine pollution and environmental damage by
ships.
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OECD
Workshop on IUU Fishing Activities
Key
observations and findings by the Workshop Chairs
The
issue of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing has
moved to the forefront of the international fisheries policy
agenda in recent years. Governments around the world have
recognised the negative effects of IUU fishing activities on
resource sustainability, biodiversity and economic and social
sustainability. In many cases, the burden is borne by the
fishing industry. The OECD hosted a workshop on IUU fishing
activities in Paris on 19-20 April 2004. The objective of the
workshop was to gather information and data on the extent of IUU
fishing and identify the economic and social drivers to IUU
fishing. Around 120 experts from OECD and non-OECD countries,
regional fisheries management organizations, international
governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and
academia attended the workshop.
The
workshop was organized around 4 sessions addressing: the state
of play of IUU fishing; data and information needs; economic and
social drivers; and possible future actions. The following
observations and findings from the Workshop have been compiled
by the Workshop Chairs.
THE
STATE OF PLAY ON IUU FISHING
-
IUU
fishing is a world-wide problem, affecting both domestic
waters and the high seas, and all types of fishing vessels,
regardless of their size or gear.
-
IUU
fishing is harmful to fish stocks and undermines the
efficiency of measures adopted nationally and
internationally to secure fish stocks for the future.
-
IUU
activities also have adverse effects on the marine ecosystem,
notably on the populations of seabirds, marine mammals, sea
turtles and bio-diversity as a whole (discards, etc.).
-
IUU
fishing distorts competition and jeopardizes the economic
survival of those who fish in accordance with the law and in
compliance with relevant conservation and management
measures.
-
There
are important social costs associated with IUU fishing as it
affects the livelihoods of fishing communities, particularly
in developing countries, and because many of the crew on IUU
fishing vessels are from poor and underdeveloped parts of
the world and often working under poor social and safety
conditions.
-
The
impact of IUU fishing for some species (primarily tuna and
tuna-like species) is global, whereas that for other species
(e.g., Patagonian toothfish and Orange roughy) is specific
to those areas where such species occur. This means that
global and local solutions are required, as well as
solutions tailored to specific species.
-
There
is a concern that excess capacity in fisheries in OECD
countries can lead to a spillover of capacity into IUU
fishing activities.
-
IUU
fishing is a dynamic and multi-faceted problem and no single
strategy is sufficient to eliminate or reduce IUU fishing
— a concerted and multi-pronged approach is required
nationally, regionally and internationally, and by type of
fishery. The full range of players should be involved in
helping bring forward solutions to the IUU problem.
-
Many
developed and developing states have not been fully
responsible in complying with their responsibilities as flag
states, port states, coastal states, states of vessel owners
and trading nations.
-
The
FAO International Plan of Action to combat IUU fishing
contains tools to tackle the IUU issue. The question is to
find ways to better implement such tools.
INFORMATION
AND DATA NEEDS
-
In
spite of recent improvements in information collection,
there remains a lack of systematic and comprehensive
information on the extent of IUU operations and impacts.
This is compounded by the varying level in quality,
accessibility, reliability and usefulness of the available
data.
-
There
are a number of international instruments addressing the
collection of fisheries information and statistics. However,
these need to be integrated and further, there remains a
need for improvement in national statistics on trade in fish
and fish products, especially in relation to IUU fishing.
-
There
is a diversity of actors involved in gathering, processing
and disseminating information on IUU fishing activities —
governments, intergovernmental organizations, RFMOs, RFBs,
NGOs and industry.
-
Trade-tracking
and the resulting accumulation of information by market
countries are an enormous task but it is very important for
the creation of effective measures to combat IUU fishing.
-
There
is a need to broaden the scope of the information gathered
so it covers activities and situations “upstream” and
“downstream” of the IUU fishing operations themselves.
This will help to better define the nature and scope of IUU
fishing and to improve knowledge of the economic and social
forces which drive IUU fishing in order to help target
future actions.
ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL DRIVERS
-
Under
current conditions, IUU activities can be extremely
profitable due, amongst other factors, to lower cost
structures than for compliant fishing activities. Strategies
to combat IUU fishing need to include measures that reduce
the relative benefits and raise the costs of IUU fishing.
-
The
demonstration effect achieved by government and RFMO efforts
in fighting IUU activities is significant. This will
provide positive signals to legal fishers and send the
message to IUU fishers that their products will be excluded
from the international market and that their activities will
not be tolerated.
-
Inefficient
domestic fisheries management may work as a driver for IUU
fishing activities; the more economically efficient
management is the higher the fisher income will be and thus
lessen the incentive to engage in IUU activities.
-
The
size of penalties and the risk of being apprehended is not
generally a sufficient deterrent to IUU fishing activities.
This is complicated by the ease of re-flagging vessels and
the difficulties in tracking company structures and
identifying beneficial owners of IUU vessels. The lack of
harmonisation of penalties across countries is also a
concern.
-
IUU
fishing inflicts damage on a law abiding fishing industry
aiming at sustainable exploitation.
-
IUU
fishing activities also make it harder for countries to
strike a balance between food security and protection of the
marine environment.
POSSIBLE
ACTIONS
-
There
is a wide range of possible measures that can be undertaken
to address the problem of IUU fishing. These will need to
cover legal, institutional, economic and social dimensions
and will require the involvement of multiple players in the
national, regional and international fisheries sectors.
-
Determining
the cost-effectiveness of alternate approaches to addressing
IUU fishing problems should be undertaken to help identify
priorities amongst the possible options so that the best
results can be obtained from limited resources that are
available to national governments and international
organizations.
Flag
state actions
-
Links
between flags of convenience and tax havens have been
established and a more concerted approach towards both could
be undertaken.
-
There
is a need to improve transparency on the procedures and
conditions for re-flagging and de-flagging.
-
More
countries could usefully investigate the possibilities for
applying extra-territorial rules for their nationals.
-
The
penalties for IUU offences should be significantly increased
and harmonised between jurisdictions.
Port
state actions
-
The
development of minimum guidelines for port
state controls and actions against IUU fishers, particularly
with respect to the use of prior notice and inspection
requirements (including health and safety conditions), should
be encouraged. The harmonisation
of these controls and actions should be a priority.
-
There
is a need to ensure a broader use of port state control
measures including inspections, preventing access to
services and goods of IUU vessels
-
There
needs to be an agreement to make it illegal to tranship,
land and trade in IUU fish.
-
There
is also a need to improve the monitoring of the provision of
at-sea services and transhipment of fish and fish products.
Coastal
state actions and international trade responses
-
It
is necessary to augment monitoring, control and surveillance
capacities and improve fisheries management across the board,
but in particular in developing countries.
-
Improving
and extending the use of catch and trade documentation
schemes could help provide additional information on IUU
activities.
-
Fair,
transparent and non-discriminatory countermeasures should be
adopted,
consistent with international law,
against countries that do not comply with the conservation
and management measures adopted by RFMOs or fail to
effectively control the vessels flying their flag in order
to ensure they comply with the conservation and management
measures adopted by RFMOs.
-
Countries
should identify the area of catch and name of fishing vessel
and its past history (of name and flag) in order to collect
information necessary for better fisheries management and
elimination of IUU fishing.
RFMO
actions
-
Strengthening
the mandate and role of RFMOs and RFBs, in particular their
possibilities for tracking IUU fishing, is an important
requirement.
-
There
is a need to improve information sharing and cooperation
among RFMOs, particularly in terms of linking and
integrating their data on IUU fishing activities.
-
More
RFMOs should consider publishing lists of companies and
vessels engaged in high seas IUU activities and lists of
vessels that are authorized to fish. The use of positive and
negative lists of IUU fishing vessels and companies is
strongly encouraged in this regard.
-
The
creation of a global record/register of authorised fishing
vessels that are technically capable of engaging in high
seas fishing should be considered.
-
International
coordination
-
Resources
matter: more technical and financial resources are needed
for capacity building, in particular in the developing
states for monitoring, control and surveillance, and in all
activities in combating IUU activities.
-
The
international community should move to ratify relevant
international treaties on labour and working conditions in
the maritime sector in order to strengthen international
hard and soft laws to protect fishing crews in general.
-
Improved
monitoring foreign direct investments (out-going and
in-coming) in the fishing sector will assist in tracking
potential IUU fishing operations.
-
Work
should be undertaken nationally and multilaterally to lift
the veil of corporate secrecy surrounding the companies
undertaking IUU fishing activities and related services.
Partnerships between public authorities and businesses offer
important scope in the fight against IUU. In this regard,
the OECD Guidelines for Multinationals offers some
possibilities that could be followed-up by national
regulatory authorities.
-
A
major effort is required, in particular by regional
fisheries management organisations and market countries, to
collect and disseminate relevant information.
-
The
efforts already underway to improve information at all
levels and mechanisms to share information need to be
supported and strengthened.
NGO
and private sector actions
-
Whenever
possible, governments should consider bilateral consultation
with businesses engaged in IUU activities to determine if
alternative means of getting IUU vessels out of the business
can be found.
-
There
should be continued efforts to communicate the IUU problem,
for example through promotional/educational campaigns with
the market including intermediate buyers, processors,
distributors and consumers. Such activities will help raise
awareness of the problem and improve the knowledge of the
social, economic and environmental consequences of IUU
activities.
-
Industry
and NGOs should be encouraged to continue to self-organise
their response to IUU fishing and information collection.
Source: http://www.colto.org/OECD_workshop_outcomes.htm
IUU HIGH ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AGENDA
Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is a major impediment to the
achievement of long-term sustainable fisheries, according to the findings of a report delivered at the
recent 32nd session of the UN Food and Agriculture (FAO) Governing conference in
Rome. Noting that some 75% of world fisheries are already being fully
exploited, overexploited, or depleted, delegates to the FAO meeting reaffirmed their
commitment to give full effect to the implementation of FAO’s International
Plan of Action to prevent,
deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IPOA-IUU).
In June 2001, 110 countries endorsed the IPOA-IUU, which calls on nations to develop and implement their
own plans to fight the problem as quickly as possible.
In related news, the creation of a five-nation Ministerial Task Force to
combat the poaching of fish stocks by pirate fishers was announced at a Deep Sea conference in New Zealand. The
Task Force, under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), will be led by British Environment Minister Elliot
Morley and include fisheries ministers from New Zealand, Australia, Chile,
and Namibia.
“The rape and pillage of the high seas needs practicable solutions by experts,
and that’s what we hope to achieve,” said OECD Chairman Simon Upton. The five-nation Task Force will
put up in neon lights what could be done.” The Task Force will draw up its plans for solutions over the
next 18 months to two years, and include contributions from scientists, legal experts, environmental groups,
and business people.
Australian Fisheries Minister Senator Ian Macdonald said “the task force
will produce a crisp analysis of illegal fishing on the high seas, together with recommended actions that can be
both implemented by task force members, and advocated as the best course of action for others to
follow.”
Links to further information:
FAO’s Progress Report on IPOA-IUU Implementation
http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/007/J0403e.htm
FAO press release, 3 December 2003
http://www.fao.org/english/newsroom/news/2003/25379-en.html
ENN, 3 December 2003
http://www.enn.com/news/2003-12-03/s_10958.asp
Deep Sea Conference 2003 homepage
http://www.deepsea.govt.nz/
FRANCO-AUSTRALIAN
MARITIME PACT
France and Australia
have signed a maritime cooperation agreement to help reduce
illegal fishing in the Southern Ocean. The treaty, signed on 24
November in Canberra establishes a formal framework for
cooperative surveillance and research activity by France and
Australia in their respective territorial seas and exclusive
economic zones (EEZ) in the Southern Ocean. This will include
exchanging information on the location, movements and licensing
of fishing vessels and working more closely together to fight
illegal fishing.
“The treaty shows
the high level of cooperation between countries on illegal
fishing issues and sends a strong message to illegal fishing
operators who seek to plunder the world’s oceans, completely
disregarding the long-term damage they cause for the sake of a
short-term profit,” said Australian Foreign Minister Alexander
Downer in a statement.
In recent years,
illegal fishing in the Southern Ocean has increased,
particularly the fishing of the valuable Patagonian Toothfish,
commonly known as Chilean Seabass, which has been targeted by
foreign fishing vessels in Australia’s EEZ around Heard Island
and the McDonald Islands, and around France’s Crozet Islands
and Kerguelen Islands. The signing of this treaty follows the
recent apprehension of the Viarsa 1, a Uruguayan-flagged vessel
suspected of illegally fishing Patagonian Toothfish in
Australia’s territorial waters.
Links to further
information
Australian
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 24 November 2003 http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2003/joint_illegal_fishing.html
Environmental News
Service, 24 November 2003
http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/nov2003/2003-11-24-03.asp
IUU Fishing and
State Control Over Nationals
International Conference Against Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing
Santiago de Compostela, Spain
Presentation
by David A. Balton
Director, Office of Marine Conservation
November 25-26, 2002
“What
giants?” said Sancho Panza.
“Those thou seest there,” answered his master, “with the
long arms, and some have them nearly two leagues long.”
“Look, your worship,” said Sancho, “what we see there are
not giants but windmills, and what seem to be their arms are the
sails that turned by the wind make the millstone go.”
“It is easy to see,” replied Don Quixote, “that thou art
not used to this business of adventures; those are giants; and
if thou art afraid, away with thee out of this and betake
thyself to prayer while I engage them in fierce and unequal
combat." (1)
INTRODUCTION
The
negotiation of the FAO International Plan of Action on Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in many ways brought to mind
the adventures of Don Quixote. Like Cervantes’ hero, some of
us involved in that negotiation saw ourselves as engaged “in
fierce and unequal combat” against the bad actors of world
fisheries, as we tried to restore a system of ethical rules to
guide human activity in this field.
Perhaps other saw us as tilting at windmills.
The
IPOA takes an approach to the problem of IUU fishing that would
have made Don Quixote proud, one that is universal in scope and
resolute in temperament. All
FAO Members have undertaken meaningful commitments under the
IPOA, both in their general capacity as States as well as in
their more particular capacities as flag States, port States,
coastal States, market States and as members of regional fishery
management organizations.
My
presentation today will focus on one aspect of the IPOA that has
not received much attention -- State control over nationals.
One reason why IUU fishing has been such a persistent
problem is that many States have not been successful in
controlling the fishing activities by their nationals that take
place in the waters of other States or aboard vessels registered
in other States. Admittedly,
it may be difficult for many States to control, or even to be
aware of, such activities.
States may also have difficulty in preventing their
nationals from reflagging fishing vessels in other States with
the intent to engage in IUU fishing.
The
IPOA nevertheless calls on all States to take measures or
cooperate to ensure that their nationals do not support or
engage in IUU fishing. This
presentation will consider a number of measures that States have
taken in this regard and will also take another look at the
“reflagging problem” that, unfortunately, remains with us to
this day. I will
also suggest some additional steps for addressing IUU fishing.
EXISTING
MEASURES
Under
international law, a State is free to enact laws prohibiting its
nationals from engaging in IUU fishing, even if the activity in
question would take place aboard a foreign vessel or in waters
under the jurisdiction of another State. (2)
Some States have already done so.
For
example, Japan requires its nationals to obtain the permission
of the Japanese Government before working aboard non-Japanese
fishing vessels operating in the Atlantic bluefin tuna and
southern bluefin tuna fishing areas.
The goal of this measure is to prevent Japanese nationals
from becoming involved in IUU fishing aboard foreign vessels.
Japan also intends to deny permission to any Japanese
national to work aboard a foreign fishing vessel in any other
fishery, if the vessel’s flag State is not a member of the
regional fishery management organization (RFMO) regulating that
fishery.(3) New Zealand
and Australia have also enacted legislation restricting the
activities of their respective nationals aboard foreign vessels
registered in States meeting certain criteria.
In
the United States of America, the Lacey Act makes it unlawful
for any person subject to U.S. jurisdiction to “import, export,
transport, sell, receive, acquire, possess or purchase any fish
... taken,
possessed or sold in violation of any ... foreign ... law,
treaty or regulation.” Hence,
a U.S. national may be prosecuted for engaging in certain forms
of IUU fishing aboard foreign vessels or in waters under the
jurisdiction of another State. (4)
A
RETURN TO THE “REFLAGGING PROBLEM”
The
European Union now also appears to be moving to control IUU
fishing by nationals of its Member States in a way that is
bringing renewed attention to the “reflagging problem.”
In May 2002, the European Commission issued a
“Community Action Plan for the Eradication of Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing.”
In considering measures to control nationals of EU Member
States, this paper presents the following objective:
to discourage
Community Member State nationals from flagging their fishing
vessels under the jurisdiction of a State which is failing to
fulfill its flag State responsibilities and from committing
infringements.
The
articulation of this goal represents a positive development in
the attitude of the European Commission toward the problem of
vessel reflagging. We
must recall that the international community recognized the
gravity of this problem more than ten years ago.
Agenda 21, adopted by the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, called upon
States to
take effective
action, consistent with international law, to deter reflagging
of vessels by their nationals as a means of avoiding
compliance with applicable conservation and management rules
for fishing activities on the high seas. (5)
Following
the Earth Summit in Rio, the FAO served as the forum for the
development of a new treaty to address the reflagging problem,
which ultimately became the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement.
An original draft of this treaty would have required
Parties to prohibit their nationals who owned fishing vessels
from reflagging those vessels to other nations for the purpose
of avoiding compliance with conservation and management measures
adopted by RFMO. The
original draft would also have required Parties to take
practical steps to enforce this prohibition.
The
European Union opposed this fundamental approach at that time.
The EC delegation argued that fishing vessel owners
frequently reflag their vessels for perfectly legitimate reasons,
and that reflagging also often occurs legitimately when fishing
vessels are sold to owners in other countries.
At the time a fishing vessel is about to be reflagged, a
government cannot know whether the vessel owner is reflagging
the vessel with the intent to avoid compliance with conservation
and management measures. Certainly,
a fishing vessel owner on the verge of reflagging a vessel is
unlikely to announce such intent.
Many governments are not even aware of when vessels
subject to their jurisdiction are in the process of being
reflagged, making the regulation of reflagging quite difficult
for them.
These
concerns forced the negotiation of the FAO Compliance Agreement
on to a different track. The
Agreement, as adopted by FAO, imposes no obligations on Parties
to take any action to deter their nationals from reflagging
fishing vessels to notorious flag-of-convenience States.
Instead, the Agreement focuses solely on the
responsibility of flag States to control the fishing activities
of their vessels.
The
elaboration of specific flag State responsibilities in the FAO
Compliance Agreement (and in a number of other international
instruments, particularly the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement) has
contributed significantly in the fight against IUU fishing.
The international community now has a well-recognized set
of standards by which to measure the actions of flag States in
exercising control over their fishing vessels.
Unfortunately,
the elaboration of these standards is not enough.
The FAO Compliance Agreement is not yet in force.
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement, though it entered into
force in 2001, has only 32 parties (6), none of which could be
considered notorious flag-of-convenience States.
Meanwhile, there are still quite a few such States who
offer their flag to fishing vessels without any real ability, or
even intention, to control the fishing activities of those
vessels.
As
evidenced by the IPOA on IUU Fishing, the international
community has come to realize that reliance on flag State
responsibility alone will not solve the problem of IUU fishing
being committed by reflagged vessels.
The “flagging out” States (that is, the States whose
nationals are seeking to reflag their vessels) should take steps
to control such reflagging.
We cannot depend exclusively on the actions of the
“flagging in” States (that is, the new flag State).
Of
course, the concerns relating to the ability of the “flagging
out” States to regulate reflagging remain, but there are ways
to address them. Governments
face similar circumstances in trying to regulate or prohibit any
activity of their nationals, where one necessary element is the
intent of the person undertaking the activity.
In such situations, governments can adopt laws or
regulations prohibiting persons from undertaking the activity in
question, then penalize those who subsequently undertake the
activity if evidence exists that such person had the requisite
intent. Accordingly,
if a government has evidence that a reflagged fishing vessel
owned or operated by one of its nationals is committing IUU
fishing, the government would have at least a prima
facie case that the vessel owner or operator reflagged the
vessel for that purpose.
On
the strength of such evidence, the government could prosecute
the owner and operator, assuming the government could obtain
jurisdiction over such individuals.
The government might also be able to take certain actions
against the vessel directly (e.g., by prohibiting the vessel
from ever being re-registered in the original flag State or by
prohibiting it from landing or transshipping fish in its ports).
In particularly egregious cases, it might even be
possible for a government to take action against other vessels
owned by the same owners that have not yet been reflagged (e.g.,
by revoking fishing permits applicable to them).
RFMOs
can also play a role in this effort, particularly by identifying
flag States whose vessels are undermining the effectiveness of
their conservation and management measures. (7)
States can then take measures to deter their nationals
from reflagging fishing vessels, or from initially registering
new vessels, in the identified States.
Such measures could include controls on deletion of
vessels from national registers, controls on the export of
fishing vessels (8), publicity campaigns to make vessel owners
aware of those States that have been so identified, and a
prohibition on allowing vessels that are or have been registered
in such States ever to be re-registered in the initial flag
State.
Accordingly,
I hope that the European Community and all other members of the
international community vigorously pursue efforts to control the
reflagging of fishing vessels by nationals for the purpose of
engaging in IUU fishing.
NEW
INITIATIVES
However,
States must do more to control the activities of their nationals
than merely regulate the reflagging of fishing vessels.
Owners and operators of fishing vessels sometimes
register their vessels in responsible foreign States, but use
those vessels to commit IUU fishing anyway.
The flag State, of course, has responsibility to take
action against such IUU fishing, as do any other coastal States,
port States or market States if the IUU fishing involves them.
But
the State of nationality of the owner or operator of the vessel
can also act. For
example, the State of nationality can make it a violation of its
law for its nationals to engage in fishing activities that
violate the fishery conservation and management laws of any
other State or that undermine the effectiveness of conservation
and management measures adopted by a RFMO.
Such a law could be drafted as follows:
A
person subject to the jurisdiction of [State] who...
(a) on
his or her own account, or as partner, agent or employee of
another person, lands, imports, exports, transports, sells,
receives, acquires or purchases; or
(b)
causes or permits a person acting on his behalf, or uses
a fishing vessel, to land, import, export, transport, sell,
receive, acquire or purchase,
any fish taken,
possessed, transported or sold contrary to the law of another
State or in a manner that undermines the effectiveness of
conservation and management measures adopted by a Regional
Fisheries Management Organization shall be guilty of an
offence and shall be liable to pay a fine not exceeding [insert
monetary value].
Sanctions
against nationals that have engaged in such IUU fishing could
include, for example, monetary fines, confiscation of fishing
vessels and fishing gear and denial of future fishing licenses.
(9)
As
detailed in paragraphs 73 and 74 of the IPOA, each State
should ensure that its nationals (as well as other individuals
under their jurisdiction) are aware of the detrimental effects
of IUU fishing and should find ways to discourage such
individuals from doing business with those engaged in IUU
fishing.
To
complement the actions of States in controlling their
nationals, we must also see greater efforts to press flag
States to fulfill their responsibilities.
As one step in this process, the United States has
provided funding to FAO to host an event designed to remind
governments that maintain open vessel registers of the
measures that need to be taken to help control IUU fishing and
to urge them to take those measures.
The event is being planned for mid-2003, tentatively in
Miami. FAO is
intending to invite representatives from governments of States
that maintain open registers, as well as certain other
individuals with relevant expertise, to make presentations in
their individual capacities. (10)
RFMOs
must also continue to adopt strong measures to control IUU
fishing. The
United States was pleased that ICCAT, at its most recent
meeting in Bilbao, adopted decisions to enhance its use of a
vessel “black list” and also to develop a complementary
vessel “white list.”
Since the ICCAT black list will now be used to take
action against individual vessels (and not only flag States),
we believe that ICCAT acted properly in making the process for
listing and de-listing vessels more rigorous, so as to provide
greater due process and certainty.
CCAMLR also took steps at its most recent meeting to
control IUU fishing further, including through the creation of
a pilot program for electronic control of its toothfish Catch
Documentation Scheme, a commitment not to allow vessels with
bad records to re-register in the territories of CCAMLR
members and movement toward a centralized Vessel Monitoring
System.
Finally,
we also must recognize than any effective action to combat IUU
fishing cannot take place in isolation from other related
initiatives underway in the field of international fisheries.
In particular, efforts to reduce fishing capacity in
oversubscribed fisheries and efforts to eliminate subsidies
that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing must be key
parts of our overall strategy.
Governments must use available public funds to reduce
overcapacity, not to exacerbate it.
Governments have no justification, for example, in
providing assistance toward the construction of new fishing
vessels that are likely to seek to enter fisheries that are
already fully subscribed.
CONCLUSION
Don
Quixote de la Mancha represented the bold idealism of the
human spirit untarnished by realism.
To succeed in the struggle against IUU fishing, we must
tap the well of this bold idealism, but channel our efforts in
realistic ways. In
a very real sense, the world has shrunk in the years since
Cervantes wrote his masterpiece.
People can move from place to place with an ease that
Cervantes probably never even imagined.
People who own or operate fishing vessels can also move
their vessels from ocean to ocean -- and from registry to
registry -- with remarkable ease today.
In such a world, governments must use all the tools at
their disposal to ensure that all people subject to their
jurisdiction use fishing vessels responsibly.
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Japan, for example, has since 1999 denied all requests
to export large-scale tuna longline vessels.
In addition, Japan has worked through industry channels
to develop understandings that certain former Japanese vessels
owned in Taiwan Province of China should be scrapped and that
others constructed in Taiwan should either be registered and
regulated there or scrapped.